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Among contemporary analytic cultural practices, theo-retical practices (praxes), and the humanities more 
broadly, the field known as affect theory occupies a central, 
perhaps even fundamental, place. Like other theoretical ori-
entations, this term takes its name from a key concept that 
serves as a guiding principle, one that not only unlocks an 
important dimension of our social and cultural life, but also 
shapes its qualities.
One cannot help but observe that this perspective tackles 
issues that are as old as culture and the humanities them-
selves, yet it does so in a manner that reorients and restruc-
tures the field of study; it generates new sub-disciplines (such 
as the study of emotional communities and their role in the 
processes that shape history and civilization) and reconfig-
ures the positions and meanings of other key concepts in the 
humanities vocabulary (notably intellect, mind, experience, 
matter, sensuality, corporeality, etc.) in a way that invites 
other, hitherto unaddressed, questions – ones that can be 
leveled at established subjects and problems – and produces 
different and novel answers.
There is much to suggest that affect studies – practiced 
in the West for well over two decades, but a mere few years 
in Poland – are not a fleeting trend and have established 
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a lasting foothold in the humanities. It cannot be ruled out that the theory will 
permeate deeper into the disciplinary and methodological traditions of the hu-
manities, and in doing so transform our perception of their subject as well as the 
principles and processes by which they are determined. Philosophers of culture, 
sociologists, psychologists, writers and artists all assert that we live in affective 
societies; that we form emotional communities in which social and community 
bonds are founded on a shared affective amalgam (a predominantly negative one, 
at that: consider the “culture” of profuse hatred and “flaming” on the Internet) rather 
than on rational choice and recognition.
It is likely for this reason that collectively expressed and articulated feelings 
and emotions function in a paradoxical way: they join and separate their partici-
pants, at once uniting and dividing them. They stimulate groundbreaking and un-
predictable political actions and retroactively revise the collective memory of the 
past. They dismiss the sterile notion of the classic subject – a rational manager 
of himself, his relations with others and the world – and propose instead a vision 
of the individual with an embodied mind, one who elicits and negotiates, rather 
than manages, his needs, goals, and relations with others; an individual who co-
creates the community he shares with the non-human world… All of this takes 
place within the open horizon of sensual-affective experiences. Complementing 
this image of a present sensitized to affective relations is technology that will pro-
vide – if it does not do so already – applications for electronic communication 
devices that will display the affective stances of one’s interlocutor even before his 
or her views have been heard.
It is apparent that a similar transformation is occurring in our perception 
and performance of culture, in which the emphasis is shifting from the nominal 
and adjectival sense (that is, a product or quality that grounds it in the “objecti-
fied heritage” of human output or depicts it as a normative system of symbolic 
control over human activity) to its verbal aspect. The latter stresses cultivation, or 
a creative activity that is directed, on the one hand, at prompting growth and the 
unleashing of hidden capabilities, showing respect for the value of someone or 
something’s existence, and, on the other hand, at planning and controlling develop-
ment, breeding and nurturing the desired shapes of the developed forms.
The activation of this actional aspect that is central to the etymology of culture 
(from cultio and colere: to cultivate, nurture, shape, celebrate) alerts us to the fact 
that, firstly, culture is above all else that form of creative activity that breathes life 
into something that would not have been realized without this external and “ob-
stetrical” (somewhat maieutical) – and at once supervisory and managerial – in-
tervention. Unfortunately, this process is not an unambiguously positive one; its 
nature can be emancipatory or colonial. It is no coincidence that culture and colony 
(and, by extension, colonization) share their etymology; the process of cultivation 
contains the possibility of either encouraging the fulfillment of potential or follow-
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ing pathways of development that hew to imposed cultural patterns and norms – 
including ones inflicted by institutions and authorities.
Secondly, the verbal, actional concept of culture demonstrates that an inherent 
quality of this notion of cultural production is the affective aspect, that is, an out-
ward-facing “inclination” toward someone or something. It does not strive to domi-
nate the object of its attention, but simply to let it be. As testified by Słownik War-
szawski (the Polish dictionary compiled by Karłowicz, Kryński, and Niedźwiecki at 
the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries; old dictionaries of other languages reveal 
comparable meanings), aside from afekt (affect), the Polish language in the past 
distinguished afekcja (affection: an inclination toward someone or something) 
from afektacja (affectation: excess, feigned affect). Arct’s loanword dictionary (pub-
lished in the interwar period) additionally provides the cognate verb afekcjonować: 
to have a liking for something, to favor. This aspect thus involves a kind of inclina-
tion toward something or someone – our “fundamental” predisposition – that is an 
expression of interest in that which is outside of ourselves and our attraction to the 
Other, encouraging in turn the growth and being of that which is other. It allows 
this other to exist; it allows it to be other; it makes way for the ethics of guest-
otherness1 – hospitality to the Other and his or her otherness – and responsibility 
(as Cezary Wodziński emphasizes visually in his elaboration on the idea proposed 
by Derrida).2 Unfortunately, it is this latter meaning that has displaced and replaced 
the former in contemporary Polish – and in contemporary culture – to the detri-
ment of the thing itself and the manner about which it is spoken.
The cultural study of affect is concerned with both (affect and affectation), 
but places greater emphasis on the first: the methods of articulation and repre-
sentation (and arousal, influence, organization, etc.) of affects, emotions, feelings, 
moods, and so on, in artistic and cultural practice. Their typology remains rather 
unstable and is typically specified by the context or individual and inventive defini-
tion projects. One could argue that little has changed since the original endeavors 
were made in this field (such as the book published by Altieri fourteen years ago3 
and Deleuze’s concept of affective intensity4).
1 A play on the Polish word gościnność, hospitality, which is divided here into gość, guest, 
and inność, otherness. [Translator’s note]
2 See Cezary Wodziński, Odys. Esej o gościnności (Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria, 2015).
3 See Charles Altieri, The Particulars of Rapture. An Aesthetics of the Affects (Ithaca, London: Cor-
nell University Press, 2003).
4 See, for example Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Graham Burchell 
and Hugh Tomlinson (London, New York: Verso, 1994); Brian Massumi, Parables for the Vir-
tual. Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002); Brian Massumi, The 
Politics of Affect (Oxford: Wiley, 2015); Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotions (London: 
Routledge, 2004); The Affective Turn: Theorising the Social, ed. Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean 
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The list of problems “opened up” by this new theoretical dictionary is in fact 
much longer. To avoid a more detailed and lengthy discussion, let us mention 
three that are likely the most problematic: (1) are affects (in their myriad forms, 
modalities, and combinations) represented in texts and other cultural objects, or 
are they articulated by other, nonrepresentational means of expression, including 
via negativa, that is, by way of gaps, interstices, or the interference of discursive 
or artistic organization; (2) are affective “meanings” (like the “meanings” conveyed 
in images) separate modes of communication, or can they be examined within the 
limits of a broader understanding of the semantic values of the cultural text; (3) 
can the intellect–affect relationship be regarded as a binary opposition, or are we 
to pursue a new way of conceptualizing it; if so, what would this new approach 
entail? As can easily be surmised, the arguments invariably point to the latter of the 
two positions.
Whether the broad range of scholarship initiated by affective studies deserves 
to be described as yet another “turn” (a periodization label that has depreciated 
significantly) – or is simply the latest in a series of cultural studies “vocabularies” – 
is likely of little importance. What is worthy of notice, however, is that it effectively 
serves the same methodological purpose. If, as Bachmann-Medick observes,5 turns 
are revealed by their use of conceptual vocabularies not just to identify and de-
scribe (new) objects, but as entirely new analytical categories – methodical opera-
tional procedures that alter the established ways of describing the object of study, 
identifying new features, dimensions, and functions of the reality being explored 
– then affective studies undoubtedly fulfill these requirements.
They are used not only to study new qualities (or “intensities”) of contempo-
rary culture, but also – and perhaps primarily – to reinterpret the outdated image 
of past humans, societies, and cultures. And, as is often the case with such at-
tempts at revolutionary reinterpretations, they dispense rather unceremoniously 
with the existing body of knowledge and nuanced, multi-perspectival views on the 
field of study. They appear at first glance to often propose a single “affective” point 
Halley (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2007); Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Formy aktywności umysłu. Ujęcia kognitywistyczne. 
Vol. 1: Emocje, percepcje, świadomość, ed. Andrzej Klawiter (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Nau-
kowe PWN, 2008); Anne Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feel-
ing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); Emocje w kulturze, ed. Małgorzata Rajtar 
and Justyna Straczuk (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2012); The Af-
fect Theory Reader, ed. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (Durham, London: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 2012); Kultura afektu – afekty w kulturze. Humanistyka po zwrocie afektywnym, 
ed. Ryszard Nycz, Agnieszka Dauksza and Anna Łebkowska (Warszawa: IBL PAN, 2015); Teksty 
Drugie 6 (2013), 1 (2014) (essays on the subject of affect).
5 Doris Bachmann-Medick, Cultural Turns. New Orientations in the Study of Culture, trans. Adam 
Blauhut (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2016).
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of view, narrowly profiled toward the interpretation of a given discipline, system, 
artistic current, or genre, only to cast in even starker relief the cognitive benefits 
of this undertaking (even at the cost of presenting an incomplete or biased im-
age). Viewed from this perspective, they can be said (for now) to be mere scholarly 
manifestos announcing new cognitive standpoints in the public reflection of the 
humanities on culture and new outlooks therein, rather than meticulous inves-
tigations, nuanced conjectures, or robust, argument-driven adjustments to the 
established image of culture.
On the other hand, however, these incomplete findings, scholarly probes, 
and analytic inquiries are gradually changing the existing cultural landscape, its 
perception, the nature of the theoretical and analytic practice, and the prevailing 
views concerning its nature. Not only do they imply the legitimacy of examining 
culture through its affective dimension, they also encourage the conclusion that 
we are now entering “affective culture,” that is, a contemporary culture whose dis-
tinguishing features stem in large part from its “investment” in affective relations 
that determine the dominating forms of art and literature, leaving an unmistak-
able mark on the preferred types of attitudes and behaviors, and on the preferred 
institutional strategies for organizing and managing the “experience society” whose 
arrival was heralded long ago by Gerhard Schulze.6
Furthermore, upon closer examination, this “affective culture” acquires mean-
ings that prevent it from being placed within the standard dualities of modern 
thought. One might say that it is located in a sort of “non-place” in the traditional vo-
cabulary of the humanities, as it transcends the oppositions of nature and  nurture, 
intellect and emotion, the individual and the community, the linguistic and the 
extra-linguistic, the semantic representation of concepts and the sensual experi-
ence… seizing a tremendously rich and diverse spectrum of affective excitements 
and reactions, which take the form of affects, emotions, feelings, moods… that 
activate in various media, forms, and genres of high (“elite”) and popular  culture.
This brings us to another significant aspect of affective studies, aside from 
its preoccupation with affective states and processes in their relationships with 
other human organs, senses, faculties, and predispositions: namely, the projec-
tion of affective readings (as well as the affective perception and cognition) on all 
sorts of objects. This can be likened to the psychological, sociological, or semiotic 
practice of “framing.” Affective framing directs our attention, allowing us to identify 
the desired objects and goals, and select the appropriate strategy with which to ac-
complish the task… At the same time, the process of affective framing is general 
in nature: it involves directing our attention to an “exciting” element (phenomenon, 
6 See Gerhard Schulze, Die Erlebnisgesellschaft. Kultursoziologie der Gegenwart (Frankfurt am 
Main: Campus, 1992). On this subject, see also Scott Lash, Another Modernity. A Different Ra-
tionality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).
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event, or thought), isolating it from others, intensifying it, performing a value judg-
ment and the re-hierarchization of its qualities, and correlating it with other ele-
ments with which it forms a sort of constellational whole or figure.
In this manner, the process can describe not only techniques for organizing the 
emotional impact of popular or elite art, but also the broad development of new 
cultural texts or even theoretical discourses in the humanities, particularly at the 
stage of incomplete crystallization, exploration, or the search for systemic regu-
larities among the amalgam of phenomena encountered in experience – that is, 
when the theory is at the stage of “practicing theory” or “theory in practice.” It is 
also in this territory – the scholarly discourse of the humanities – that affect first 
operates as the Spinozian conatus: as an impulse or stimulator of attention, which 
then activates, profiles, and organizes cognitive processes in close ties with the 
environment.
The theoretical practices of new currents in the humanities (in such fields as the 
engaged humanities, posthumanism, and enactivism) undoubtedly make deliber-
ate use of this affective tool in their critical explorations: they excite and direct our 
attention; they create perceptive–cognitive frames that structure the organization 
of components according to their implicit value; they activate audiences, influenc-
ing their attitudes, mentality, behavior, and actions. The discourse of these new 
humanities is affective in the aforementioned sense and for more fundamental 
reasons: it is excited and energized by its inherent affection – its inclination to act 
for the good of the other, an inclination that combines affective stirring with cogni-
tive curiosity and ethical sensitivity.
I propose that this method of cognitive action – a dominant one among the 
procedures of inquiry employed in the new humanities – be called probing, as it is 
to a certain extent a unique methodical tactic. It has several distinct features that 
distinguish it from the standard methods associated with the humanities. Firstly, it 
involves studying the environment in question from within, in the field of a mutu-
ally shared experience. Secondly, it relies on the tentative, selective penetration 
of the problematic territory, typically through the study of specific cases. Thirdly, 
its preferred technique is the peculiar “plying” of objects, events, and processes 
with questions and experimental interventions, enabled by new conceptual vo-
cabularies, thus eliciting and presenting hitherto imperceptible qualities of the 
object of study.
This issue presents a selection of essays from the field of affective studies in Po-
land, spanning – and probing – nearly all the disciplines and orientations within 
the humanities today. The texts deal with matters ranging from philosophy to the 
overlapping domains of the sociological and cultural, the political and psychoana-
lytical, the ethnographic and anthropological, and the aesthetic and theoretical. 
They comprise studies in the fields of literature and film, theater and gender stud-
ies, memory studies and Holocaust studies, focusing on analyses of key complex 
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affects, such as love, shame, and guilt, as well as on their transformations and the 
flows of affective “intensities,” which often remain in the state of amalgamative 
indeterminacy.
Considering the sheer diversity of subjects and methodologies contained with-
in this brief selection of texts, I believe they provide a decent introduction to the 
field of affective studies in Poland at their current stage of development. They 
invite the realization that affective studies tend not toward the creation of a new 
area or discipline of study, but rather toward a reorientation and critical reinter-
pretation (redefinition) of the objects, tools, methodologies, and theories of study 
within the humanities, both in their classic and new forms.
Translation: Arthur Barys
